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Spurred by the perception that fundamental changes in the
global economy are reducing American competitiveness and that
the standard of living in the United States may be declining,
American business leaders, labor leaders, government officials,
and academics have begun to re-evaluate traditional methods of
management.1 Since the 1970s, an increasing number of busi-
nesses have explored the use of employee involvement organiza-
tions as a means of retaining or regaining a competitive edge.
Experimentation with employee involvement has led to an
explosion of employee organizations, including, but certainly not
limited to, quality circles, work improvement programs, quality
of worklife improvement groups, participative management
groups, cost study teams, competitive action teams, autonomous
or semi-autonomous work groups, parallel organization struc-
tures, special task forces, business teams, and personal effec-
tiveness programs.
The National Labor Relations Act2 has received increased
attention recently due to the Act's proscription of company-
dominated labor unions under section 8(a)(2). The question of
whether the Act precludes employer implementation of employ-
ee involvement groups was, and continues to be, widely debated.
This attention has focused especially on two of the National
Labor Relations Board's recent decisions: Electromation, Inc.3
t This essay reflects the opinion of its author and does not necessarily
represent the view of the National Labor Relations Board.
tt Member, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.; B.A., M.A.,
University of Maryland, 1968, 1970; J.D., Georgetown University, 1975.
1 See e.g., EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, THE NEW AMERICAN
WORKPLACE (1994). Appelbaum and Batt argue that "business as usual" is not
working for at least two reasons: 1) Firms in the newly industrialized
countries are able to compete in price-conscious markets by paying wages that
are much lower than those paid in the U.S.; and 2) the cost advantages of
American-style mass production were lost because of the diversity and
customization made possible by computer-based technology. Id. at 3.
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
3 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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and E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co.' Electromation was charac-
terized as the Board's most closely watched decision in years.5
The impact of both decisions has been hotly argued; one amicus
curiae brief in du Pont suggested that finding such employee
committees unlawful "thwart[s] the myriad efforts being under-
taken by labor unions, employee groups, and employers to
develop human resource policies to meet the challenges of the
21st Century.
6
Unhappily, unnecessary confusion persists as to whether
employee involvement organizations violate the National Labor
Relations Act. According to a 1993 survey conducted by the
Labor Policy Association in cooperation with other industry
groups, over forty percent of 532 responding companies stated
that the federal government was "seriously questioning" employ-
ee involvement.' In another forum, one management spokes-
man expressed the concern that the law should not require
"employees to check their brains at the front door when they
come to work."'
My purpose is not to explore each of the various types of
employee involvement programs but to discuss the National
Labor Relations Act and the nature and extent of its prohibition
of company-dominated employee groups. I hope to show that
the area of permissible conduct between the Scylla of violating
the Act and the Charybdis of maintaining outdated or uncom-
petitive styles of management is wider than many believe. The
Act has definite restrictions that nevertheless allow for a wide
range of lawful employee involvement organizations. According-
ly, I discuss in Part I Congressional intent as expressed in the
Act itself and in deliberations leading to its passage. In Part II,
I provide an overview of the Board's test for determining the
lawfulness of employee groups and discuss Electromation and
du Pont in Part III. I suggest in Part IV employee involvement
methods that do not violate the National Labor Relations Act,
4 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
' Martin Salwen, NLRB says Labor-Management Teams at Firm Violated
Company-Union Rule, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1992, at A12.
6 311 N.L.R.B. at 899.
"Labor Policy Association, The Nature and Extent of Employee Involvement
in the American Workplace (presented to the Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, 1994).
8 Paul Weiler & Guy Mundlak, New Directions for The Law of the
Workplace, 102 YALE L.J. 1907, 1992 (1993).
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and in Part V, I outline proposed changes in the law. I conclude
by providing a short checklist to guide employers in bringing
their employee involvement organizations into compliance with
section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act provides
that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it."9
Section 2(5) of the Act defines a "labor organization" as "any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representa-
tion committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of
pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."'" A proviso
to section 8(a)(2) states that employers are not prohibited from
conferring with employees during working hours without a loss
of time or pay for the employee."
The purpose of section 8(a)(2) is deeply rooted in the Act's
legislative history and is intertwined with other fundamental
statutory protections and principles. One commentator noted
that the "role of the company union was, in fact, the most
important substantive issue in the political fight over the
drafting and passage" of the Act in 1935.' Sponsors of the
National Labor Relations Act considered section 8(a)(2) to be a
direct corollary to the guarantee under the National Industrial
Recovery Act's section 7 of employees' right to select their own
bargaining representatives."
9 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
'
0 Id. § 152(5).
nId. § 158(a)(2).
Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power,
Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1386 (1993).
"3 Section 7(a) of the precursor to the National Labor Relations Act
provided in pertinent part that:
Every code of fair competition ... shall contain the following
conditions: 1) that employees shall have the right to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of em-
ployers or labor, or their agents, in the designating of such repre-
sentative or in self-organization or in other activities ... ; and 2)
1994]
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Although congressional intent to outlaw "sham" unions is
unmistakable, it is equally clear that Congress did not intend to
outlaw all communications between employers and employees.
In its report to the full Senate, the Senate Labor Committee
noted that "[t]hese abuses do not seem ... so general that the
Government should forbid employers to indulge in the normal
relations and innocent communications which are part of all
friendly relations between employer and employee."'14 The
report concluded that the object of this section was "to remove
from the industrial scene unfair pressure, not fair discus-
sion."'5  It is within this framework that the Board and the
courts have applied section 8(a)(2).
II. THE TEST FOR EMPLOYEE
INVOLVEMENT GROUPS - AN OVERVIEW
To decide whether an employee involvement committee
violates section 8(a)(2), the Board engages in the two-step
inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Cabot
Carbon Co. 6 Under that test, the Board addresses two basic
questions: 1) Is the committee a "labor organization" for pur-
poses of the National Labor Relations Act?, and 2) did the
employer dominate the formation or operation of the committee?
The Board must find both labor organization status and domi-
nation by the employer to find a violation of section 8(a)(2).
A. Is THE GROUP A LABOR ORGANIZATION?
Under the National Labor Relations Act, a group is a labor
organization if: 1) Employees participate in the organization; 2)
the organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of
that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required
as a condition of employment to join any company union or to
refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of
his own choosing...."
National Industrial Recovery Act, § 7(a), ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 198 (1933),
decl'd unconst., A-L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 195 U.S. 495
(1935). Section 7(a) was the quid pro quo for the National Industrial Recovery
Act's provisions permitting employers to join together and set industry "codes"
fixing prices and production in violation of the antitrust laws.
14 S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1104 (1949).
15 Id.
16 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
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"dealing with" employers; and 3) these dealings concern condi-
tions of work or other statutory subjects such as grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, or working hours. 7
Since the premise of employee participation programs is
employee participation, this first requirement of the three-part
test is rarely at issue. The second requirement, however, which
focuses on the "purpose" of the organization and whether it
"deals with" the employer, requires some clarification. Although
the Board inquires into the "purpose" of employee involvement
committees, the Act does not require a finding of anti-union
animus to find an 8(a)(2) violation. As the majority stated in
Electromation, "[plurpose is a matter of what the organization
is set up to do, and that may be shown by what the organization
actually does."'" Furthermore, in Cabot Carbon the Supreme
Court held that "dealing with" covers a broader range of activity
than "collective bargaining" and does not necessarily involve
negotiations of a collective bargaining agreement or even em-
ployer agreement to employee proposals. 9 Moreover, the
structure of a statutory labor organization need not be formal;
it may lack a constitution, bylaws, elected officials, formal or
regular meetings, or dues. Because the statute lists only man-
datory subjects of bargaining, there is a strong argument that if
the committee addresses only permissive subjects of bargaining
it is not a statutory labor organization.
In Electromation, Inc., a majority of the Board concluded
that Congress intended the definition of "labor organization" to
include a broad range of employee groups but reserved judg-
ment on the question of whether it is necessary to find that an
organization acts in a representational capacity for it to be a
statutory labor organization." In my concurrence, I concluded
that such a finding is necessary.2' In my view, an employee
committee avoids the proscription of section 8(a)(2) when it does
not act as the agent or advocate of other employees, because the
employer is not usurping the employees' right to choose their
own bargaining representative. This distinction, I think, follows
Congressional intent in proscribing "sham" unions while permit-
17 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
18 309 N.L.R.B. at 996.
19 360 U.S. 203, 204-18 (1959).
20 See 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994-97 (1992), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
2 1 Id. at 998-1005 (Devaney, Member, concurring).
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ting "fair discussion" between employers and employees.22
B. HAS THE EMPLOYER ENGAGED IN UNLAWFUL DOMINATION?
In assessing section 8(a)(2) violations, the second basic
inquiry is whether the employer has dominated the labor
organization. Illegal domination may occur in the formation or
in the administration of the organization. An employer may
dominate the formation of an organization by formulating the
idea for the organization, creating the organization, forming its
structure, writing the bylaws or other governing principles,
appointing the members, or determining the method by which
the members of the organization are to be selected. An employ-
er also may dominate the administration of an organization
through actions such as determining the subject matter ad-
dressed in meetings, having management members on the
committee, having veto power over issues, and controlling the
operation of the committee.
Although most federal courts of appeals have accepted the
Board's test and analysis of Section 8(a)(2) and 2(5),23 some
have denied enforcement of Board decisions because they dis-
agreed with particular aspects of the Board's analysis. For
instance, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a group is a labor organi-
zation only if the General Counsel demonstrates that the em-
ployees subjectively believe their group to be a labor organiza-
tion and if the employer had anti-union animus.' The Board
in Electromation found no support for this view in the Act, its
legislative history, or Supreme Court precedent, and thus did
not adopt the Sixth Circuit's approach. Similarly, the First,
Ninth, and Seventh Circuits also denied enforcement to Board
findings of section 8(a)(2) violations if the impetus for forming
the employee group came from the employees themselves.26
22 Id.
' See, e.g., Electromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 35 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994);
N.L.R.B. v. Fremont Mfg. Co., 558 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1977); N.L.R.B. v.
Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1981); N.L.R.B. v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217
F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954); see also N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203
(1959) (supporting Board's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 152(5) & 158(a)(2)
(1988)).
' Airstream, Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989); N.L.R.B. v.
Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
2 309 N.L.R.B. at 996.
2' NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka &
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The Fourth Circuit recently denied enforcement of a Board
decision in Peninsula General Hospital Medical Center."7 The
court stated it had no quarrel with the Board's test but dis-
agreed with the application of the test in the case." It found
that the employer's "Nursing Service Organization" was a lawful
"communications device" in spite of the Board's finding that the
employer presented the organization to employees as a repre-
sentative body designed to address matters such as wage
rates.29 Although the court stated it found nothing in its deci-
sion inconsistent with the Seventh Circuit's opinion enforcing
Electromation," its application of the Board's test in Peninsula
leaves room for doubt.
III. THE STATUS OF SECTION 8(A)(2) ORGANIZATIONS
Although the Board and the courts have used the Cabot
Carbon test for several decades, the Board's applications of the
test in Electromation3 ' and du Pont 2 received unprecedented
attention, in large part because of employers' expanded use of
employee involvement committees. I will first address the
employer conduct the Board found unlawful in Electromation
and du Pont. I will then discuss the types of employee organi-
zations we found to be unlawful.
A. ELECTROMATION
In Electromation the Board determined that the employer
unlawfully set up and operated "Action Committees" comprised
of employees and management representatives. The Board held
that the committees constituted a "labor organization" within
the meaning of section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations
Act"3 and that management dominated and interfered with
Knowles v. N.L.R.B., 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
2 NLRB v. Peninsula General Hosp. Medical Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir.
1994).
2 Id. at 1272-74.
2 9 Id.
30 Id. at 1271 n.10.
s' Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enfd 35 F.2d 1148 (1994).
32 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
3 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
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this labor organization in violation of section 8(a)(2) of the
Act.34 However, many observers drew the unwarranted conclu-
sion that employee involvement organizations in general were at
risk of being declared unlawful.35 To the contrary, as dis-
cussed below, the Board set forth in the majority and concurring
opinions examples of employee involvement efforts that remain
lawful under the Act.
In late 1988 Electromation management reduced employee
benefits in an effort to curb financial losses.3 6 Aroused by this
action, sixty-eight employees presented the employer with a
petition expressing disapproval of the new attendance/bonus
wage policy.37 In response, management representatives met
with eight employees, most of whom were selected at random,
and discussed with them such matters as wages, bonuses, incen-
tive pay, attendance programs, and leave.38 The president con-
cluded Electromation had serious employee problems and
decided to form five "Action Committees" to involve employees
in the decision-making process.39 The president met with the
same group of employees and gained their reluctant assent to
form the committees.4"
The employer formed several committees, which addressed
absenteeism, communications, pay progression for premium
positions, and the attendance/bonus program.41 Each commit-
tee consisted of five employee members, at least one manage-
ment representative, and the employer's employee benefits
manager.42 The employer paid the employees for committee
activity and provided meeting space and necessary supplies.43
The Attendance Bonus Committee developed a proposal that the
14 Id. § 158(a)(2).
31 See e.g., Thomas J. Piskorski, Electromation: A Setback to Employee
Participation Programs, 9 LAB. LAW. 209, 218 (1993) (commenting that no
employee participation program is safe from challenge under Electromation's
holding).
36 309 N.L.R.B. at 990.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 990-91.
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company controller, who was a committee member, rejected as
too costly." Shortly after the committees began to meet the
union demanded that Electromation recognize it. 5 The union
lost the election. 6
The majority held that the Action Committees were "labor
organizations" the employer was "dealing with" under the
National Labor Relations Act.' It found the committees' pur-
pose was to address employees' disaffection concerning condi-
tions of employment through a bilateral process in which the
aim was to reach solutions through a dialogue based on employ-
ee initiated proposals.' The majority also found that the
employee members had acted in a representative capacity and
noted that management told them to obtain ideas from their
fellow employees with the aim of providing solutions that would
satisfy employees as a whole.49 However, the majority did not
address whether such a purpose was essential to finding labor
organization status.50
The Board also found that the employer dominated and
assisted the Action Committees in violation of section 8(a)(2) of
the Act.5 ' It observed that the employer developed the idea of
the committees and created them in spite of initial employee
reluctance, drafted the written purposes of the committees, and
permitted employees to carry out committee activities during
work hours.52 The majority explained that "employees essen-
tially were presented with the Hobson's choice of accepting the
status quo, which they disliked, or undertaking a bilateral
'exchange of ideas' within the framework 6f the Action Commit-
tees."53
-In my concurrence, I agreed that the Action Committees
were labor organizations dominated by the employer but wrote
separately to respond to concerns raised by both parties regard-
44 Id. at 992.
45 Id. at 991.
46 Id. at 992.
47 Id. at 997 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988)).





53 Id. at 998.
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ing the lawfulness of contemporary employee participation
plans.5 4 In my view, section 8(a)(2) proscribes only company-
imposed sham bargaining agents; it is not a broad-based ban on
employer-employee communications. 5 Electromation manage-
ment substituted its will for the employees' and usurped their
right to choose their own representative when it formed the
Action Committees to bargain over terms and conditions of
employment, with employer-selected participants, in spite of
employee reluctance, and without evidence of majority sup-
port."6 The employer placed itself on both sides of the table by
excluding certain issues 'from discussion and "pre-screening"
employee proposals, thus giving employees the illusion of a
bargaining representative without the reality of one. 7
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board's
decision in Electromation when it held the Board properly
concluded the Action Committees were statutory labor orga-
nizations and that the employer illegally dominated them. 8
The court found it unnecessary to address the "much broader"
question concerning the general legality of employee involve-
ment organizations.59 The court also concluded it need not
decide whether labor organization status necessarily entails rep-
resentation of non-member employees,"° or whether mecha-
nisms such as suggestion boxes, brainstorming meetings, and
other information exchanges constitute "dealing" within the
meaning of section 2(5).61
In holding the Action Committees constituted labor organi-
zations, the court rejected the employer's assertion that each
committee should be considered separately; it noted the commit-
tees were created as part of the same program, were interrelat-
5 Id. at 988-1005 (Devaney, Member, concurring). Members Oviatt and
Raudabaugh also found the Action Committees were unlawful. See id. at
1003-05 (Oviatt, Member, concurring); id. at 1005-15 (Raudabaugh, Member,
concurring).
55 Id. at 1003.
56 Id.
57 Id.
5 Electromation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 35 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994) (referring
to violations of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988)).
59 Id. at 1151.
60 Id. at 1158.
1 Id. at 1161.
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ed, and had identical relationships with the employer.6 2 Up-
holding the Board's finding that the employer unlawfully domi-
nated the committees, the court also rejected the argument that
the Board improperly failed to focus on the subjective will of the
employees rather than the conduct of the employer.6 " The
court observed that "the principal distinction between an inde-
pendent labor organization and an employer-dominated organi-
zation lies in the unfettered power of the independent organiza-
tion to determine its own actions," a characteristic lacking in
Electromation's Action Committees.'
B. DU PONT
In du Pont the Board found that six safety committees and
one fitness committee were employer-dominated labor organiza-
tions within the meaning of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act.65 In considering whether the
committees were "labor organizations," the Board focused on
whether the committees were "dealing with" the employer.6 "
Finding that the committees were "dealing with" the employees,
the majority noted that the committees contained members of
management as well as employees and that it reached decisions
only by consensus. Thus, management members could reject
any proposals advanced by employee members within the
committees and thereby prevent their "presentation" to manage-
62 Id. at 1158-59.
' Id. at 1167-68 (citing in support N.L.R.B. v. Newport News, Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 249 (1939) (holding that the Board properly or-
dered the disestablishment of a company labor organization, in spite of its
successful operation to the apparent satisfaction of the employees)). The court
distinguished Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.
1955), on which the employer relied. In Chicago Rawhide, unlike in
Electromation, the employees initiated the first meeting with the employer,
the committees met outside the presence of management, and employer
representatives did not determine the subject matters to be considered, select
the members of the committees, or exercise a veto over committee recommen-.
dations. Thus, the court found the employer engaged in mere "cooperation,".
as opposed to unlawful "support."
Id. at 1170 (citing Newport News, 308 U.S. at 249).
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 895-96
(1993) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2)).
66Id. at 894.
67 1d. at 895.
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ment.6" The majority noted that the mere presence of manage-
ment members on an employee involvement committee does not
require a finding that the committee is "dealing with" the
employer.69
In my concurrence I observed that employers may not
establish and manipulate employee committees to appear to be
employee tools when such committees actually are a manage-
ment tool.7" The employer in du Pont attempted to use the
committees to freeze the union out of areas in which the union
had a vital and legally recognized interest: employee health and
safety and related bonuses and grievances. 7' However, this
decision should not be viewed as a broad ban on employer
discussions with employees on safety-related issues.72 Rather,
du Pont presented key facts that supported finding a section
8(a)(2) violation; for example, the union took an active role in
safety and proposed a joint labor-management safety committee,
but the employer rejected it and set up a rival committee that it
controlled. 3 Unlike the majority, I concluded that it was un-
necessary to consider whether du Pont "dealt with" the commit-
tees, because the record amply demonstrated the employer bar-
gained with those committees.7'
C. SUBSEQUENT CASES
In Magan Medical Clinic, Inc.,75 the Board found the em-
ployer violated section 8(a)(2) by dominating the formation of an
employee grievance committee.76 The Board noted that the
employer formulated the committee with the purpose of frus-
trating employees' attempts to determine whether they wanted
a bargaining representative, and the employer bargained with
68 id.
69 Id. (noting that management representatives who do not have the ability
to reject proposals developed by employees, or who participate simply as ob-
servers or facilitators without the right to vote, are not "dealing").
70 Id. at 899 (Devaney, Member, concurring).
71 Id. at 903.
72 id.
73 Id. at 900-01.
74 Id. at 902.
75 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994).
71 Id. However, a majority found it had not dominated the administration
of the committee.
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the committee over grievances."
In Ryder Distribution Resources, Inc.,7 a majority of the
Board found that an employer-established wage and benefit
committee was a labor organization, because the committee's
purpose was to address dissatisfaction with wages through a
bilateral process in order to reach solutions based on employee
proposals.79 Because committee members were informed that
they should poll employees and then agree about wage and
benefit preferences, the majority also found that the committee
acted in a representative capacity. 0
In my concurrence in Ryder, I agreed that the wage and
benefit committee was a labor organization.81 I noted that the
employer interfered with the exercise of the employees' right to
a representative of their choice in order to induce them to
abandon their petition for a union election.82 The employer did
this by giving the employees the impression that dealing with
the employer through an employer-dominated employee in-
volvement program would yield more favorable and faster
results than would union representation.83 Importantly, I not-
ed that certain activities of the committee, such as employee
training in problem solving and consensus building, and in
opening lines of communication between management and
employees might in other circumstances distinguish it from
statutory labor organizations.' However, I concluded that
these activities were so overwhelmed by the committee's clear
purpose of substituting itself for union representation that they
could not rehabilitate the employer's conduct.85
In two other cases, Waste Management of Utah, Inc.,86 and
Research Federal Credit Union,87 the Board found to be unlaw-
ful committees that were used by the employers to supplant the
77 id.
78 311 N.L.R.B. 814 (1993).
79 id.
80 Id. at 818.
81 Id. at 819-21 (Devaney, Member, concurring).
82 Id. at 820.
83 Id.
8 Id. at 820 n.6.
85 id.
m 310 N.L.R.B. 883 (1993).
87 310 N.L.R.B. 56 (1993).
1994]
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union or to act as an alternative to union representation. As
the Board noted in Waste Management, the committees' involve-
ment with routing, productivity and safety might have put them
outside the ambit of section 8(a)(2) had the employer not tacitly
held out the committees as alternatives to employee repre-
sentation by an organization of their choice.88
IV. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT COMMITTEES
THAT DO NOT CONFLICT WITH
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Employee participation may exist lawfully in a wide variety
of ways. The Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations (the "Dunlop Commission")
concluded in its May 1994 Fact Finding Report that among the
most longstanding and widespread employee participation
committees are those that focus on health and safety issues.8 9
According to the 1993 survey of the National Safety Council,
eighty-nine percent of unionized establishments and fifty-six
percent of non-union establishments have such committees.9"
The Commission also recognized the growing popularity of task
force teams that are problem-specific and cut across traditional
hierarchical groups by including a "vertical slice" of managers
and employees.9 It further noted that many production or
quality-focused problem solving groups evolve over time into
self-managed work teams to which many managerial functions
are delegated. 2 The Board has addressed employee involve-
ment organizations with such characteristics and found that,
under the proper circumstances, they do not violate sec-
tion 8(a)(2).
For example, the majority in du Pont explained that brain-
storming groups ordinarily are not engaged in dealing and
310 N.L.R.B. at 883.
89 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMM'N ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT 40
(1994) [hereinafter FACT FINDING REPORT].
90 Id. (citing THOMAS W. PLANEK AND KENNETH P. KOLOSH, NATIONAL
SAFETY COUNCIL, SURVEY OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION IN SAFETY AND
HEALTH (1993).
91 Id. at 37-39.
92 Id. at 39-40.
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therefore usually are not labor organizations.93 These groups
usually develop ideas to present to management rather than
make specific proposals to it. An employer legally may glean
some ideas from the process and, if it wishes, adopt some of
them. In du Pont we found that, although the employer main-
tained some unlawful employee involvement committees, its
safety conferences did not violate section 8(a)(2). 4 The stated
objective of the safety conferences was to increase personal com-
mitment, responsibility, and acceptance of safety as "the num-
ber one concern."95 The employees shared their experiences
about certain safety issues and developed ideas and suggestions
in small groups. 96 The employer informed employees that bar-
gainable matters could not be addressed and that such issues
should be handled only by the union.97 Despite uncertainty as
to whether the employer fully succeeded in keeping bargainable
issues out of discussions, the majority found that these safety
conferences were lawful brainstorming groups.98 The majority
noted that the employer's good faith effort to separate out
bargainable issues and its assurances that the union had the
exclusive role as to such issues supported the conclusion that
the conferences did not undermine the union's status as the
exclusive representative. 99
I agreed in my concurrence that the safety conferences were
lawful."0 I articulated my position that the legislative history
of section 8(a)(2) leaves employers with significant freedom
through interaction with groups of more than one and fewer
than all employees to involve rank-and-file workers in matters
formerly seen as management concerns, to call on employees'
full ability and know-how, and to increase their enthusiasm for
and commitment to quality and productivity through imple-
menting recent developments in worker effectiveness training
and empowerment.01 I noted that it is immaterial whether
93 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993).
94 Id. at 897.
95 Id. at 896.
96 Id.
97 Id.
981 d. at 897.
9 Id.
1 oId. at 898 (Devaney, Member, concurring).
... Id. at 899.
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these developments occur through hierarchical employer-struc-
tured entities or through workplace 'democratization' whereby
employees become, in a sense, their own supervisors and man-
agers. 0
2
Other Board cases, as well as legislative history, support
the conclusion that a wide range of employee involvement
methods are not proscribed by section 8(a)(2). For instance, in
General Foods Corporation,0 3  the Board found that
employer-created "teams" in which employees made job assign-
ments, assigned job rotations, and scheduled overtime among
team members by consensus were not statutory labor organiza-
tions. 10
4
Employers may also use employee involvement organiza-
tions to communicate with their employees. As I stated in my
concurrence in du Pont, if the committees there limited them-
selves to establishing and disseminating safety programs, they
would not have violated section 8(a)(2)."°5 In Sears, Roebuck
& Co.," 6 the Board upheld the finding that a "communications
committee," composed of one employee from each department
who served on a rotation system and discussed matters relating
to compensation, was not a labor organization that represented
or advocated for employees but a management tool used to in-
crease efficiency.' 7 It may also be true that employer's assur-
ances to employees that the committee is not intended as a
substitute for a bargaining representative, and that they are
free to select such a representative may affect the nature of a
committee's "purpose."' 8 I would not be inclined to find that
an employer's mere solicitation of ideas or suggestions from an
employee group constitutes "dealing with" that group." 9
Board precedent indicates that an employer lawfully may
delegate managerial functions, such as grievance resolution, if
1
02 Id.
103 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977). In my view, General Foods supports the
requirement that committees must act in a representative capacity for
employees in order to qualify as a statutory labor organization.
'04 Id. at 1236.
105 311 N.L.R.B. at 903 (Devaney, Member, concurring).
106 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
107 Id. at 233.
10 See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 1003 (1992) (Devaney,
Member, concurring), enfd, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
109 See id.
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it does so with awareness of section 8(a)(2). For instance, in
Mercy-Memorial Hosp. Corp."' the Board found that a griev-
ance committee was not a labor organization, because the
committee decided the validity of the employees' complaints but
did not give employees a role in presenting complaints to man-
agement or in discussing or negotiating with management over
those complaints."1
V. SECTION 8(A)(2) UNDER THE NEW BOARD MEMBERS
Member Stephens and I expressed our views on section
8(a)(2), but Chairman Gould, and Members Browning and
Cohen have not had a full opportunity to express their positions
in Board opinions. Member Cohen joined the majority in the
Magan Medical Clinic, Inc. decision of September 12, 1994,112
and agreed with Member Stephens and me that the employer's
involvement in the formation of employee committees violated
the Act. However, Member Cohen did not detail his position in
that case. In his 1993 book, Agenda for Reform, Chairman
Gould expresses the view that conduct designed to thwart
legitimate trade unions or to deprive employees of free choice in
the selection of representatives is necessary to find a violation
of section 8(a)(2)."' He favors the "subjective will" approach
taken by several courts of appeals in such cases as Chicago
Rawhide" and therefore would consider the employer's sub-
jective intent in forming employee involvement committees." 5
A few cases currently before the Board may provide an
avenue for the new Board to express its view on section 8(a)(2).
In Keeler Brass,"' the Board will face the question of whether
a grievance committee established by the employer to hear and
resolve employee grievances is a statutory labor organiza-
110 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977).
111 Id. at 1112.
112 314 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1994).
113 WILLIAM GOULD, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAw 140 (1993).
114 Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
115 GOULD, supra note 113, at 140.
116 Keeler Brass Automotive Group, N.L.R.B. Case No. 07-CA-32185 (Oct.
29, 1992).
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tion."7 A central issue is whether the committee's purpose is
to "deal with" the employer."' In another pending case,
Webcor Packaging Inc.,"' the Board is considering the legality
of a "Plant Committee" created by the employer that has a
majority of employee members elected by fellow employees. 2 °
In Vons Grocery Co.,"'2 also currently before the Board, the
administrative law judge found that the employer's "Quality
Circle Group" was not a labor organization." a This judge
found that the group had not attempted to represent employees
in section 2(5) matters but was simply a "study group" that
"brainstormed" on issues involving operational and capital
improvements.'
Contrary to the dire predictions of some observers, the
Electromation and du Pont decisions have not opened the
floodgates of litigation or initiated a full scale assault on em-
ployee involvement plans. Currently, only six cases involving
section 8(a)(2) and employee involvement organizations are
pending before the Board."M
One issue that may reach the Board is whether state laws
mandating certain employee involvement committees are pre-
empted by the National Labor Relations Act. In a recent memo
to the Region 10 Director, the Board's Division of Advice stated
that a complaint should be issued against an employer that
formed an employee safety committee required by Tennessee
state law.125 The Division of Advice concluded that this provi-
sion of Tennessee state law is in conflict with section 8(a)(2) and
is preempted by the Act. 26
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 N.L.R.B. Case No. 07-CA-31809 (Dec. 20, 1993).
120 Id.
11 N.L.R.B. Case No. 21-CA-28816 (Aug. 22, 1994).
'aId.
123 Id.
" See id.; Asarco, Inc., N.L.R.B. No. 16-CA-15721 (Oct. 17, 1994); Dillon
Stores, N.L.R.B. No. 17-CA-16811 (May 26, 1994); Webcor Packaging, Inc.,
N.L.R.B. No. 07-CA-31809 (Dec. 20, 1993); Stoody Company, N.L.R.B. No. 26-
CA-15425 (Nov. 23, 1993); Keeler Brass Automotive Group, N.L.R.B. No. 07-
CA-32185 (Oct. 29, 1992).
1" Goody's Family Clothing, Inc., Op. Gen'l Counsel, NLRB *4 (Sept. 21,
1993) (LEXIS, LABOR library, NLRBGC file).
126 Id.
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VI. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE LAW
The growth of employee involvement mechanisms and the
Board's Electromation and du Pont decisions fueled an intense
debate about whether section 8(a)(2) should be left untouched,
amended, modified, or simply repealed. In its Fact Finding
Report, the Dunlop Commission outlined four options:
1) Retain section 8(a)(2) in its present form; or change
that section by:
2) allowing non-union employers to establish proce-
dures by which its employees will "deal with" conditions
of employment;
3) permitting employers to establish such employee
participation procedures dealing with conditions of
work, if certain standards are met, including protection
against reprisals; or
74) requiring employers to offer their employees partici-
pation procedures meeting minimum quality stan-
dards.
Consistent with the Commission's third option, some aca-
demics suggest modifying the law to allow employers to expand
the use of employee involvement committees without entirely
denying certain protections for employees. For instance, Profes-
sor Paul Weiler suggested that section 8(a)(2).be amended to
allow non-union employers who want to experiment with em-
ployee participation to do so only if they comply with minimum
standards of employee representation.2 8 According to Weiler,
such standards would include the use of secret ballot elections,
provision of information and financial resources, and protection
of representatives from reprisal. 29 In a similar vein, Chair-
man Gould, prior to his appointment as Chairman, suggested
that section 8(a)(2) be modified to allow employee committees to
address a wide variety of subjects and to receive financial
assistance unless an inference of anti-union intent could be
inferred from the formation or administration of these commit-
tees. 30
' FACT FINDING REPORT, supra note 89, at 57.
Weller & Mundlak, supra note 8, at 1924.
1 Id.
130 GOULD, supra note 113, at 139.
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Proposals to amend section 8(a)(2) have waxed and waned
since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, most
notably during the debate over the Taft-Hartley Amendments,
passed in 1947.131 Recently, the push for amending section
8(a)(2) has gained some force. In the past session, Republicans
in Congress advanced bills that would revise section 8(a)(2). 3 2
Unions leaders generally have not favored any change in
section 8(a)(2). In a statement given before the Dunlop Com-
mission on August 10, 1994, David Silberman, Director of the
AFL-CIO Task Force on Labor Law, addressed proposed chang-
es in section 8(a)(2).'33 He expressed the AFL-CIO's support
for bilateral, democratic forms of employee participation and
asserted that the debate over whether section 8(a)(2) should be
amended is simply a "red herring.' 134 According to Silberman,
section 8(a)(2) properly prevents conduct that strikes at the
heart of employee representation rights and does not prevent a
vast range of employee participation efforts.
35
Management representatives, on the other hand, generally
express support for amending section 8(a)(2) to allow a greater
range of employee involvement organizations. The Labor Policy
Association, for example, expressed its support for legislative
change that would provide "an exemption from section 8(a)(2)'s
ban on collaborative workplace efforts that are not being adopt-
ed as a union avoidance technique.' 136  The Manufacturers
Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, Inc., also expressed its
support for such changes and asserted that there is a general
... Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 141-87 (1988)).
132 S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 1529, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
133 Hearings Before the Comm'n on the Future of Worker-Management Rela-
tions (Aug. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of David Silberman,
Director of the AFL-CIO Task Force on Labor Law).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id., (statement of Steven M. Darien, Vice President of Human Resourc-
es, Merck & Company, Inc., on behalf of the Labor Policy Association). Howev-
er, management does not universally hold this view. Jack West, Chairman of
the American Society for Quality Control, asserted that although ASQC
favored changing section 8(a)(2), many organizations have concluded that the
prohibitions of section 8(a)(2) are not a significant issue for them, because
their quality and participation approaches are not adversely affected. Id.,
(statement of Jack West).
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consensus among U.S. manufacturers that the National Labor
Relations Act should not restrict management's ability to intro-




A wide range of employee involvement organizations cur-
rently are lawful and remain unthreatened by Electromation,
du Pont, and their progeny. Understandably, employers desire
guidance for their efforts to involve employees lawfully at the
workplace. The two basic questions the Board asks to deter-
mine whether an employee involvement group violates section
8(a)(2) are: 1) Whether the group constitutes a "labor organiza-
tion," and 2) whether the employer dominated the group in its
formation or administration. A useful checklist that provides a
touchstone for employers, unions, and employees who are con-
cerned about the legality of their employee involvement organi-
zations appears in a recent article. The article suggests that in
order to remain within the legal ambit of section 8(a)(2), such
plans should:
1) Avoid structured groups in favor of ongoing employee
involvement on an individual or unstructured group
basis;
2) establish task-specific ad hoc groups that focus on a
particular communications, efficiency, or productivity
issue (as opposed to wages, hours, other conditions of
work grievances, or labor dispute issues) on a short
term basis and then go out of existence;
3) use irregular groupings of employees, such as occur
during retreats and the like, to address communica-
tions, efficiency, or productivity issues; and
4) use staff meetings to address communications, effi-
ciency and productivity issues. Such meetings should
be attended by all staff, rather than a representative
number, in order to avoid the problem of employees
representing other employees. 8'
'Id., (statement of Kenneth McLennan, President, Manufacturers
Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, Inc.).
138 G. Roger King, Employee Participation Committees: Implications of
Electromation, SocY FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. LEGAL REP. 8 (Spring 1993).
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Constructive debate was and will continue to be an impor-
tant crucible for policy evolution on the reach of section 8(a)(2).
The essays that follow provide a solid overview of arguments on
both sides of this issue. Whatever may be said of the ongoing
debate, it is clear that sham unions are still unlawful and that
some employee involvement plans are permissible. Gray areas
remain, but the new Board undoubtedly will have its chance to
speak on the policy arguments outlined in the following essays.
